山东省人民政府办公厅关于印发山东省事业单位登记管理信息公开办法的通知
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山东省人民政府办公厅关于印发山东省事业单位登记管理信息公开办法的通知
山东省人民政府办公厅关于印发山东省事业单位登记管理信息公开办法的通知
鲁政办发〔2010〕73号
各市人民政府，各县(市、区)人民政府，省政府各部门、各直属机构，各大企业，各高等院校：
《山东省事业单位登记管理信息公开办法》已经省政府同意，现印发给你们，请认真遵照执行。
山东省人民政府办公厅
二○一○年十二月七日
山东省事业单位登记管理信息公开办法
第一章 总 则
第一条 为提高事业单位社会公益服务质量和效率，保障公民、法人和其他组织的知情权、监督权，根据《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》、《事业单位登记管理暂行条例》和《山东省政府信息公开办法》等有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 经各级事业单位登记管理机构(以下简称登记管理机关)依法登记并取得法人资格的事业单位适用本办法。
第三条 本办法所称事业单位登记管理信息(以下简称登记管理信息)是指事业单位在登记管理机关对其依法核准登记和日常监管过程中制作或者获取的，以一定形式记录、保存的信息。
第四条 登记管理信息公开应当遵循合法、真实、及时、便民的原则。
第五条 各级人民政府应当加强对登记管理信息公开工作的领导。
第六条 各级机构编制部门负责推进、指导、协调、监督本级登记管理信息公开工作，具体工作由各级登记管理机关承担。
第七条 事业单位负责本单位的登记管理信息公开工作。
第八条 事业单位应当建立健全登记管理信息公开保密审查机制，依照《中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法》以及其他法律、法规和国家、省有关规定，对拟公开的登记管理信息进行审查。
事业单位对登记管理信息不能确定是否可以公开时，应当依照法律、法规报举办单位或者有关部门确定。
第二章 公开的内容
第九条 依法设立登记的信息：单位名称、住所、宗旨和业务范围、法定代表人、经费来源、开办资金、举办单位、章程以及开展业务活动所要求的资质等。
第十条 依法变更登记的信息：单位名称、住所、宗旨和业务范围、法定代表人、经费来源、开办资金、举办单位等。
第十一条 依法年度检验检查的信息：
(一)开展业务活动情况；
(二)资产损益情况；
(三)变更登记的执行情况；
(四)绩效和受奖惩情况；
(五)涉及诉讼情况；
(六)社会投诉情况；
(七)其他需要公开的情况。
第十二条 按照有关规定，事业单位对涉及人民群众切身利益、需要社会公众广泛知晓或者参与的等重大信息，应当及时、准确予以公开。
第十三条 事业单位不得公开涉及国家秘密、商业秘密和个人隐私以及可能危及国家安全、公共安全、经济安全和社会稳定的信息。
第三章 公开的方式和程序
第十四条 事业单位登记管理信息，应当在本单位网站公开；不具备条件的也可采取广播、电视、报刊、本单位的办事大厅、公开栏或其他便于公众知晓的方式公开。
第十五条 对本办法第九条至第十二条所规定的信息，事业单位应当在信息形成之日起20个工作日内予以公开，自信息公开之日起10个工作日内将公开的内容和方式报机构编制部门备案。
法律、法规对信息公开的期限另有规定的，从其规定。
第十六条 公民、法人或者其他组织可以根据与自身利益直接相关的生产、生活、科研等特殊需要，向事业单位申请获取该单位履行公益职责过程中形成的登记管理信息。
第十七条 公民、法人或者其他组织向事业单位申请获取登记管理信息的形式以及事业单位受理、办理和答复申请人的工作程序、时限、费用等要求，参照《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》和《山东省政府信息公开办法》等有关规定执行。
第四章 监督和保障
第十八条 机构编制部门应当会同有关部门，加强对本级和下一级登记管理信息公开工作的考核，并适时组织开展社会评议。考核结果和社会评议结果应当作为事业单位监督管理的内容之一，并予以公布。
第十九条 登记管理机关负责对登记管理信息公开的实施情况进行监督检查，及时对违法或者不当的行为进行纠正和处理。
第二十条 公民、法人或者其他组织认为事业单位不按规定履行登记管理信息公开义务的，可以向负责该单位登记管理信息公开工作的同级或上级机构编制部门举报，收到举报的部门应当予以调查处理。
第二十一条 事业单位在登记管理信息公开工作中有下列情形之一的，由机构编制部门责令改正；情节严重的，对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员由有关机关按规定权限予以处理；涉嫌犯罪的，移送司法机关依法处理：
(一)不按规定履行登记管理信息公开义务的；
(二)不及时更新公开的登记管理信息内容的；
(三)公开不应当公开的登记管理信息的；
(四)通过其他组织、个人以有偿服务方式提供登记管理信息的；
(五)违反规定收取费用的；
(六)隐瞒或者捏造事实的；
(七)其他滥用职权、徇私舞弊、玩忽职守的行为的。
第二十二条 事业单位有第二十一条规定情形的，登记管理机关应根据《事业单位登记管理暂行条例》规定，视情况给予警告处罚，或在年度检验检查中对其作出不合格决定。
第二十三条 机构编制部门对违反本办法规定未予整改的事业单位，暂停办理其机构编制事项。
第二十四条 登记管理信息公开工作所需经费纳入单位预算，保障登记管理信息公开工作的正常进行。
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深圳市劳动和社会保障局关于印发《深圳市医疗保险违规行为举报奖励办法》的通知
深圳市劳动和社会保障局关于印发《深圳市医疗保险违规行为举报奖励办法》的通知
深劳社规〔2008〕8号
各有关单位：
为维护我市社会医疗保险基金的安全性，保证基金合法使用，根据《深圳市社会医疗保险办法》的有关规定，我局制定了《深圳市医疗保险违规行为举报奖励办法》。现予印发，请遵照执行。
深圳市劳动和社会保障局
二○○八年四月二日
深圳市医疗保险违规行为举报奖励办法
第一条 为维护我市社会医疗保险基金的安全性，保证基金合法使用，根据《深圳市社会医疗保险办法》的有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 任何单位和个人可对定点医疗机构和定点零售药店的下列违规行为向市社会保险机构进行举报：
（一）以做假记单、假发票、假病历、假处方和将门诊病人挂名住院等手段，骗取社会医疗保险基金的；
（二）擅自将分支或者协作机构纳入定点医疗服务范围，为未取得定点资格的医疗机构或药店提供划卡记账服务的；
（三）将不符合医疗保险支付范围的药品和其他用品记入医疗保险账内的；
（四）将应由个人自费的医疗费用记入社会医疗保险账内的；
（五）多记多收医药费用的；
（六）利用社会医疗保险有关医疗照顾政策，超量配药，并转手倒卖，非法牟利的；
（七）违规使用个人账户的；
（八）其他违反社会医疗保险规定的。
第三条 任何单位和个人可对参保单位的下列违规行为向市社会保险机构进行举报：
（一）为不属于社会医疗保险参保范围的人员办理医疗保险的；
（二）为参保人医疗费用报销开具虚假证明的；
（三）其他违反医疗保险规定的。
第四条 任何单位和个人可对参保人及其他人员的下列违规行为向市社会保险机构进行举报：
（一）冒用他人身份证参保的；
（二）将本人社会保障卡转借他人就医的；
（三）持他人社会保障卡冒名就医的；
（四）利用社会医疗保险有关医疗照顾政策，超量配药，并转手倒卖，非法牟利的；
（五）违规使用个人账户的；
（六）其他违反医疗保险规定的。
第五条 任何单位和个人可对社会保险机构工作人员的下列违规行为向市社会保险机构进行举报：
（一）社会保险机构工作人员滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊的；
（二）其他违反医疗保险规定的。
第六条 举报内容应包括被举报人、举报事实、相关材料；举报事实应当清楚。
举报人要求奖励的，应署实名。
第七条 举报可以采用电话、信函、电子邮件或来访等方式。举报电话：0755－82978812；地址：深圳市福田区彩田南路2038号深圳社会保险基金管理局医保处；Email：ybjb@szsi.gov.cn。
第八条 市社会保险机构信访部门接受举报，并如实登记和记录，稽核部门及时组织有关人员对举报事实进行核查。
第九条 举报经核实后，市社会保险机构对署名举报人予以奖励，奖励金额为举报内容查实违法、违规数额的20%，但最高不得超过以下额度：
举报内容数额10万元以下的，奖励金最高不超过1万元；举报内容数额10万元以上50万元以下的，奖励金最高不超过5万元；举报内容数额50万元以上100万元以下的，奖励金最高不超过10万元；举报内容数额100万元以上的，奖励金为10万元。
第十条 市社会保险机构对受奖励的举报人发放奖励决定书并送达举报人，举报人应自奖励决定书发出之日起6个月内凭奖励决定书和本人有效身份证明到市社会保险机构领取奖励金；超过6个月内未领取奖励金的，视为自动放弃奖励。
同一违规行为如有两次以上举报的，奖励举报时间靠前的举报人。
第十一条 市社会保险机构应当采取下列措施为举报人保密：
（一）对举报人的姓名、工作单位、家庭住址及举报内容必须保密，举报材料必须专人保管；
（二）严禁将举报材料转给被举报单位和被举报人；
（三）核实情况时，要做好保密工作，不得透露举报人身份；
（四）宣传报道或奖励举报人时，未经举报人同意，不得透露或公开举报人的身份。
第十二条 因履行社会医疗保险监督职责发现单位和个人有违规行为举报的，不纳入奖励范围。
第十三条 市社会保险机构工作人员违反本办法第十一条规定，造成泄密以至损害举报人的利益或人身安全的责任人，按有关规定严肃处理。
第十四条 本办法所称以下包括本数，以上不包括本数。
第十五条 本办法自2008年4月1日起施行。原《深圳市城镇职工社会医疗保险违规行为举报奖励办法》（深社保发〔2003〕76号）自本办法实施之日起废止。
Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
